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Agricultural Credit Market Institutions  
A Comparison of Selected European Countries 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we describe and compare the institutional framework of the agricultural credit 
markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, 
authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in a 
situation where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The 
study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries.  
The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for 
the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in 
various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to 
function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for 
rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the 
farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally 
perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in 
some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending 
seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend 
a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and 
it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated 
value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit 
rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. At the same time, the financial experts 
all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other 
small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed. 
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Agricultural Credit Market Institutions 
A comparison of selected European countries 
Kristina Hedman Jansson, Chelsey Jo Huisman, 
Carl Johan Lagerkvist and Ewa Rabinowicz* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33/January 2013 
1. Introduction 
The fundament of the credit market is trust. The creditor needs to trust that the loans will be 
repaid; the debtor, on the other hand, needs to trust the creditor to make funds available on 
time. Surrounding this market of trust is an institutional framework with formal and 
informal institutions. Formal institutions are for instance rules and regulations, including 
monitoring by the state and law enforcement. Examples of informal institutions are 
behaviour, norms and relations. The formal and informal institutions are connected. When 
the formal institutions like law enforcement are slow or weak, banks will not have the trust to 
invest, and the importance of relations with informal creditors (family and friends) increases. 
Social capital (involvement and trust at a local level) has been shown to influence the way 
people act in the credit market: whether they use checks or cash, and whether they use formal 
or informal creditors (Guiso et al., 2004). It also influences the behaviour of banks – high 
social endowment reduces the interest rates (Andriani, 2010). 
There will always be some level of uncertainty in the credit market, as the promise to give out 
money for the promise of a return in the future is of course uncertain. Uncertainty, together 
with agency problems (adverse selection and asymmetric information) can cause 
inefficiencies in the market, leading to credit rationing. Although it can be argued that these 
problems are present in any sector, agency problems are more prevalent in agricultural firms 
than in comparable firms in other sectors due to the organisational structure of the firms. 
Proprietary farms have no or little obligation of public disclosure of their financial situation. 
It is thus more difficult for a bank to judge the financial performance of the sector and of the 
individual firms in agriculture. Credit rationing means that firms cannot get credit to the 
extent they need it, as creditors will not provide enough capital to satisfy the market even 
though the market is in equilibrium (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). A recent study has shown that 
the risk of credit rationing is somewhat higher in agriculture than in other sectors, measured 
as the “probability of receiving a loan” (Weber and Musshoff, 2012). Although once they 
receive loans, they are not volume-rationed. All in all, this leads to the agricultural firms 
being under-capitalised and shows inefficiencies in the agricultural credit market. 
For an efficient credit market it is important that the institutional framework functions well 
to overcome uncertainty and agency problems. In this study, we look at the formal and 
informal institutions and how they work in the case study countries. We look at the following 
formal institutions: rules and regulations, credit market actors (type of creditor and volume) 
and government support – indicating a formal response to inefficiencies in the market. The 
informal institutions are important, since uncertainties can be diminished with the help of 
relations, shared or known norms and values. We also see how these are connected when 
looking at the risk assessment factors. 
  
                                                        
* Kristina Hedman Jansson is educational secretary, Department of Economics, Chelsey Jo Huisman is 
research assistant, Department of Economics, Carl Johan Lagerkvist is professor and Head of the 
Department of Economics and Ewa Rabinowicz is professor and Head of Policy Analysis, Department 
of Economics at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU). 
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This working paper aims at describing and comparing the agricultural credit market 
institutions in the case study countries. The main source of information has been a 
questionnaire put to the teams of the consortium, who then contacted experts in the financial 
sectors. The timing of the survey made it difficult to carry out; during this period the banks 
were under severe criticism for being too generous when providing loans and not sufficiently 
considering the financial situation of the loan recipients. Since the theme of the 
questionnaire is in part the reasoning applied in risk assessment, the topic turned out to be 
highly sensitive in some countries. It is thus a subjective and only partial picture that emerges 
from this material. Nevertheless, all the partners handed in completed questionnaires, 
though not everyone had managed to answer all of the questions. For a further description of 
the survey and questionnaire, see appendices 1 and 2. 
The working paper starts with the formal institutions as they are described in the 
questionnaires: the regulations of the credit market, government support and main creditors. 
Then the informal institutions are described through the functioning of the credit market, 
and finally the availability of credit (hinting at credit constraints). This shows how the 
functioning of the market influences the availability of credit in the case study countries. 
Finally, we draw some conclusions from the study. 
2. Financial markets in the case study country – Results of the 
questionnaire 
2.1 Regulation of the credit market 
The capital market in every country is governed by a set of regulations. It is often within the 
jurisdiction of the central bank (e.g. Riksbanken of Sweden) to set up the rules and 
regulations for the smooth functioning of the nation’s capital market. The central bank might 
also monitor whether the rules and regulations are followed, but monitoring can be carried 
out by other authorities, such as the financial supervisory authorities in Sweden and Finland. 
Apart from the rules and regulations set within a country, financial institutions are also 
subject to a set of international rules, regulations and maybe recommendations. An 
important international guideline is the Basel framework, which sets international standards 
for regulating credit markets and rests on three pillars (BIS, 2006). The first pillar specifies 
how to calculate the minimum requirements for capital and how to judge credit risks, 
operational risks and market risks. The second pillar outlines how to build up a supervisory 
process and why this is important. The third pillar deals with market discipline. The 
framework has been developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which 
consists of representatives from central banks or other supervisory authorities from different 
countries.  
Most of the case study countries in the questionnaire have general credit market regulations 
and regulators, but only a few have regulations specific to agriculture (see Table 1). In the 
latter case, it is usually the ministries of agriculture (the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), Italy and France) that are involved in regulations. In Poland, the 
Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture subsidises interest, which is 
linked to a specific regulation. For all EU countries, some EU regulations1 should have 
influence over the agricultural credit market, but this aspect is only mentioned in the Greek, 
German and Italian case studies. 
  
                                                        
1 European Commission Regulation of 15 December 2006 No. 1857/2006 on state aid to small and 
medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products (OJ L 358/3, 16.12.2006) 
and Commission Regulation No. 1535/2007 of 20 December 2007 on the application of minimum aid 
in the sector (OJ L 337/35, 12.12.2007) are mentioned in the German study. 
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Table 1. Regulating authorities and their role in the case study countries  
Country Authority Role 
Sweden Financial supervisory authority 
(FI) 
Supervises the total credit market, decides on the loan value of land, 
regulates capital adequacy related to loans on mortgage in 
farmland. 
Finland Financial supervisory authority Monitors the total credit market – nothing specific exists for 
agriculture. 
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland No reply 
UK Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) and the Financial 
Ombudsman Service 
The FSA regulates financial services and has the following 
objectives: 1) market confidence, 2) financial stability, 3) consumer 
protection, and 4) reduction of financial crime. It sets out standards 
in a Handbook of Rules and Guidance. 
The Financial Ombudsman settles complaints between consumers 
and financial businesses. 
Netherlands De Nederlandse Bank (DNB), 
Autoriteit Financiele Markten 
(AFM) 
The DNB works for a reliable financial system. 
Greece Bank of Greece, Ministry of 
Finance  
The Bank of Greece supervises the financial markets. The Ministry 
of Finance monitors the financial markets. 
Rules and regulations for agricultural capital are as for the general 
credit market, but in addition EU regulations influence the 
agricultural sector. 
FYROM Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Water Economy 
(MAFWE), Agency for 
financial support in agriculture 
and rural development 
MAFWE subsidises farmers and the Agency distributes funds from 
the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). 
Germany Bafin (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), 
Deutche Bundesbank 
Monitors and regulates the total credit market. (Aspects pertaining 
to agriculture are related to EU regulations for specific support for 
farmers.) 
Poland Agency for Restructuring and 
Modernisation of Agriculture 
(ARMA) 
Subsidises interest; the work of the Agency is regulated in the Act of 
Parliament on ARMA and the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers 
on tasks of ARMA. 
Italy Banca d’Italia, Instituto di 
servize per il mercato agricolo 
alimentare (ISMEA), Ministry 
of Agriculture, Società gestione 
fondi per l'agroalimentare 
(SGFA) 
Banca d’Italia regulates commercial banks and the Ministry of 
Agriculture monitors ISMEA and the SGFA. 
The financial sector is regulated in the Banking Credit Bill (Articles 
38-43, n. 385/93). Several of the articles refer to the Civil Code, the 
main reference for civil and economic interactions. The Decree from 
the Ministry for Agricultural and Forestry Policies (14.02.2006) 
regulates an inter-bank fund that guarantees collateral to 
agricultural firms. Credit aspects of the rural development policies 
are regulated through a combination of EU, national and regional 
laws. 
Slovakia National Bank of Slovakia Provides on-site and off-site supervision of supervised entities in 
the area of banking, the capital market, etc. It acts and decides on 
supervision issues, actually conducts on-site and off-site 
supervision and prepares draft regulations implementing the 
financial market laws. 
France Banque de France, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of 
Agriculture 
The Banque de France and Ministry of Finance regulate the total 
credit market. The Ministry of Agriculture decides on subsidised 
loans to farmers. The Ministry of Finance sets the general 
regulations for banking. An important regulation recently is the 
LOLF (Loi organique relative aux lois de finances) of 1 August 
2001. 
Belgium Central European Banking 
supervisor (CEBS), National 
Bank of Belgium (NBB) 
CEBS and NBB work in the regulation of the general credit market. 
In the Flemish region, the local government provides credit 
subsidies (capital, interest and state guarantees).* 
* Agricultural policies in Belgium are decided at the regional level. In this case study, the answers in general cover federal and 
Flemish policies. It might be the case that the same or similar regulations exist in Wallonia. 
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2.2 Government support 
As a result of a poorly functioning, inefficient market, governments might want to step in to 
support agricultural firms in the credit market. This can be done through loan guarantees 
(common in the Central and Eastern European countries during transition), credit subsidies, 
specific agricultural credit institutions, investment allowances or payback guarantees. Yet 
this has been shown to be an inefficient policy in Central and Eastern Europe during the 
transition (Swinnen and Gow, 1999). In the case of loan guarantees, there are several risks: 
banks’ incentives to screen and monitor and farmers’ incentives to repay are reduced, and 
there is a discrimination against alternative sources of credit. Credit subsidies will in the long 
run have a negative influence on inflation and nominal interest rates. Specialised agricultural 
credit institutions can provide lower transaction costs owing to a higher level of expertise, 
thus reducing the asymmetric information problem. On the other hand, they incur a higher 
portfolio risk, since they are specialised (Swinnen and Gow, 1999). We can expect some of 
these negative impacts of government intervention to be general – and not specific to 
transition countries. 
Government support exists in most of the case study countries, but the type varies among 
them (see Table 2). Loans, as in principal sums lent directly by the government, only exist in 
the Netherlands and FYROM. Subsidised interest rates are more common: Finland, the 
Netherlands, Greece, Germany and Poland all have this feature. Payback guarantees are 
available in Greece, Poland (though it is not used) and Italy. Investment allowances are 
available in Finland, the Netherlands, Greece, FYROM, Germany, Poland and Italy. 
Table 2. Different types of government support (a) and their relative importance (in %) (b) 
in the case study countries  
Country  Loans 
(principal 
offered  
by the 
government) 
Subsidised 
interest rates, 
with the 
principal 
financed in the 
open market 
Payback 
guarantees 
Investment 
allowances (part of 
the investment cost is 
recovered as a 
subsidy) 
Sweden a None of the alternatives are applicable 
 b No reply 
Finland a  √  √ 
 b 0 40 – 10 
Ireland a No reply 
 b No reply 
UK a None of the alternatives are applicable 
 b No reply 
Netherlands a   √ √ 
 b – – 25 75 
Greece a  √ √ √ 
 b – 30 60 10 
FYROM a No data 
 b No data 
Germany a  √  √ 
 b – 50 – 50 
Poland a  √ √ √ 
 b – 100 0 0 (since 2010) 
Italy a   √ √ 
 b No reply 
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Table 2. cont’d 
Slovakia a None of the alternatives are applicable 
 b No reply 
France a  √   
 b  
Belgium a  √ √ √ 
 b – 57 1 42 
 
The involvement of government varies widely among the countries: in Ireland and the UK, 
there is no involvement at all by governmental credit institutions, whereas in Germany and 
FYROM, for example, there are several different types of governmental institutions involved 
in the agricultural credit market (see Table 3). The most common type of governmental credit 
institution is ‘private banks that supply government-subsidised loans, market-funded’. As 
mentioned above, the involvement of governmental institutions in the credit market can 
distort the market. If governmental involvement is a sign of governments perceiving the 
markets as inefficient, then only three case study countries have functioning credit markets 
for agriculture: Ireland, the UK and Slovakia. 
Table 3. Governmental credit institutions in the case study countries 
 Government-
owned agency 
that is 
market-
funded  
Government 
agency that 
supplies 
subsidised 
government 
loans to farmers  
Private banks 
that supply 
government-
subsidised 
loans, market- 
funded  
Private banks that 
transfer subsidised 
government loans 
and receive 
commission fees 
from government  
Sweden √a)    
Finland   √  
Ireland No such agency exists 
UK No such agency exists 
Netherlands   √b)  
Greece √  √  
FYROM  √ √ √ 
Germany √ √ √  
Poland   √  
Italy  √ √  
Slovakia No such agency exists 
France   √  
Belgium   √c)  
a) The government is one of the shareholders of a commercial bank. 
b) Agricultural Loan Guarantee Fund since 1951; available budget in 2009: €100 million; loans supplied by banks 
c) Flemish region 
2.3 The primary stakeholders: Creditors and debtors 
In this section, we investigate who the main creditors are in the case study countries. Some 
studies, including Schmidt and Kropp (1987), have found that access to financial services by 
small-scale farmers is normally seen as a constraining factor. The lending practices also need 
to match the needs of the target group; otherwise, the farmers will not apply for credit or will 
not be granted credit. This study deals with the agricultural markets, thus the borrowers 
referred to are always agricultural firms. The lenders (creditors or loan providers) can differ, 
however, and it is also possible that the rules and regulations governing each type of creditor 
6  JANSSON, HUISMAN, LAGERKVIST & RABINOWICZ 
vary. Furthermore, the behaviour of the creditor is likely to depend on the type of creditor (a 
profit-maximising commercial bank is not likely to make judgements on the same grounds as 
a farmers’ cooperative bank, whose main goal is serving the interests of its members). The 
type of creditor is also relevant for the agricultural credit market, since lending practices 
might diverge among different creditors.  
The categories of creditors in this study are commercial banks, mortgage institutions, 
farmers’ cooperative banks, government (in the form of governmental credit institutions, not 
subsidies), sellers of input supplies, others in the informal market (such as family and micro 
financing) and others (as in none of the above).  
Commercial banks are free market players that can use different types of collateral and which 
can adjust interest rates based on the risk assessments they conduct. They are usually large, 
and sometimes international companies, such as ING Group, BNP Paribas, Lloyds and 
Nordea. Mortgage institutions provide loans for buildings or other property like farmland; a 
mortgage loan is a loan secured by real property. Farmers’ cooperative banks are co-owned 
by a group of farmers and are usually not commercial in the sense that serving the interest of 
the members of the cooperative, rather than profit maximisation, is the main goal. Sellers of 
input supplies are suppliers that would provide credit for the input they are selling. This 
would simply mean that the agricultural firm could pay its suppliers in (monthly) instalments 
rather than in cash when purchasing inputs. 
There are very small differences among the various asset categories when it comes to who the 
main provider is (see Table 4) within each case study country. Commercial banks are the 
most important providers in most of the countries and for all the assets. Farmers’ cooperative 
banks are important in the Netherlands and Poland, and in Sweden the category ‘other’ is the 
most important provider, regardless of asset.   
Table 4. Most important loan providers by country and asset* 
Asset category Commercial banks Farmers’ 
cooperative banks 
Mortgage 
institutions 
Farmland Finland, UK, Greece, FYROM, Italy, 
Slovakia, France, Ireland, Belgium 
Netherlands, Poland Sweden 
Farm buildings Finland, UK, Greece, FYROM, 
Slovakia, Ireland, France, Belgium 
Netherlands, Poland Sweden 
Equipment and 
machinery 
Finland, UK, Greece, FYROM, 
Slovakia, Ireland, France, Belgium 
Netherlands, Poland Sweden 
Operating capital, 
incl. inventory 
UK, Greece, FYROM, Slovakia, Ireland, 
France, Sweden, Belgium 
Netherlands, Poland Sweden 
* In Germany, commercial banks and farmers’ cooperative banks are most important, but we were unable to 
attribute their importance by asset category. 
Table 5 shows the share of the main loan providers in the different asset categories and 
countries. For farmland investments, the main creditors are commercial banks (which are 
most important in Finland, the UK, Greece, FYROM, Italy, Slovakia, Ireland and France). 
Mortgage institutions only play a role in the UK (30%), which on the other hand has no 
farmers’ cooperative banks or governmental credit institutions. Farmers’ cooperatives are the 
most important creditors in Poland (69%) and the Netherlands (75%), and play a significant 
role in Sweden (23%) and Slovakia (10%). Suppliers provide a big share of credit in FYROM 
(30%) and in Slovakia (20%), while they play a minor role in Greece (7%) and in Sweden 
(2%), and no role at all in the other case study countries. Other informal providers of loans 
have a notable share in the Netherlands (10%), but a smaller or no share at all in the rest of 
the case study counties. In Sweden, the largest share of credit is held by ‘mortgage 
institutions’ at 39%.  
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Table 5. Main loan providers by asset category and country (in %) and outstanding volume 
Country   Comm. 
banks 
Mortgage 
inst. 
Farmers’ 
coop 
banks 
Gov. 
credit 
inst. 
Suppliers Others 
(informal) 
Outstanding 
volume 
(million €) 
SE Land 32 39 23 0 2 4 23 817a) 
Build. 32 39 23 – 2 4 – 
Equip. 35 40 – – 25 5 – 
Capital 50 50 – – – 5 – 
FI Land 95 0 – 5 0 0 3 000  
Build. 90 0 0 5 5 – 1 000  
Equip. 90 5 – – 5 – 500  
Capital – – – – – – – 
IE No reply 
UK Land 70 30 – – 0 <1 13 730b) 
Build. 65 30 – – 5 <1 
Equip. 60 0 – – 40 <1 
Capital 100 – – – – – 
NL Land 15 – 75 0 0 10 13.5c) 
Build. 18 – 77 – – 5 13.5c) 
Equip. 20 – 80 – – 0 4c) 
Capital 20 – 80 – – 0 4c) 
EL Land 90 0 3 0 7 0 NA 
Build. 90 – 3 – 7 – NA 
Equip. 90 – 3 – 7 – NA 
Capital 90 – 3 – 7 – NA 
FYROM Land 40 0 0 0 30 0 – 
Build. 40 0 0 0 30 – – 
Equip. 40 0 0 0 30 – – 
Capital 40 0 0 0 30 – – 
DE Land 60 – 40 – – – 35 000 (total) 
Build. 20 – 60 20 – – 
Equip. 20 – 60 20 – – 
Capital 40 – 60 – – – 
PL Land 30 0 69 0 0 1 300  
Build. 30 0 65 0 3 2 150  
Equip. 35 0 57 0 3 5 150  
Capital 10 0 80 0 5 5 0.1 
ITd) Land ~100 N/A N/A – N/A – 2 839  
Build. – – – – – – 8 400  
Equip. – – – – – – 4 372  
Capital – – – – – – – 
SK Land 70 0 10 0 20 0 5% 
Build. 70 0 10 0 20 0 5% 
Equip. 70 0 10 0 20 0 5% 
Capital 70 0 10 0 20 0 7% 
FR Land ~90 – – – Some Some 40 500 (total) 
Build. ~90 – – – Some Some 
Equip. ~90 – – – Some Some 
Capital ~90 – – – Some Some 
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Table 5. cont’d 
BE Land – 0 0 0 – – No reply 
Build. – 0 0 0 – – No reply 
Equip. – 0 0 0 – – No reply 
Capital – 0 0 0 – –– No reply 
a) EUR/SEK at 9.25 
b) £12 billion = €13,733 billion, exchange rate at 2011, year average from www.riksbanken.se 
c) The share per asset category had to be estimated, since banks lend money to farms as whole entities, not by asset category. It is 
a combination of the shares of fixed assets and investments made by farmers and assessments by banks. 
d) Even though the main (sole) provider of credit is commercial banks, the government has an influence through ISMEA, which 
offers some beneficial loans, and through suppliers offering credit. It is unclear, however, how big their share is. 
Regarding farm buildings, the situation is more or less the same as for farmland. Commercial 
banks play the biggest role in most of the countries (Finland, the UK, Greece, FYROM, 
Slovakia, Ireland and France). The main difference compared with farmland is that the 
creditor category ‘suppliers’ has a share in more countries: in Sweden, Finland, the UK, 
Greece, FYROM, Poland and Slovakia. The highest shares are in FYROM (30%) and Slovakia 
(20%).  
The situation for equipment and machinery differs from that for farmland and farm buildings 
– the main providers are more or less the same as those for farmland and buildings, but the 
suppliers play a more significant role in loans for equipment than for other assets in Sweden 
and the UK. In the Netherlands, the farmers’ cooperative banks are even more important in 
providing loans for equipment (at 80%) than for land and buildings. 
Also, the general picture is the same for operating capital: the main providers are commercial 
banks. In Sweden, however, equally important is the category ‘mortgage institutions’ and in 
Poland the role of the commercial banks is much smaller for operating capital (10%) than for 
other assets, where instead the farmers’ cooperative banks (80%) increase in importance. 
The change in the case study countries over the past ten years when it comes to the number 
of creditors is displayed in Table 6, broken down by type of loan provider. The country 
standing out the most in this table is Greece: commercial banks and farmers’ cooperative 
banks have been decreasing in numbers at the same time as suppliers have been increasing. 
An increasing number of suppliers is not solely the case for Greece, yet the other countries 
have not had a corresponding decrease in other types of creditors. The number of commercial 
banks has increased in Finland, FYROM, Slovakia and France, decreased in Greece and 
Poland, and remained unchanged in Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy. Mortgage 
institutions have spread in Slovakia, but their number has stayed the same in Sweden and 
FYROM. Farmers’ cooperative banks have expanded their presence in Greece, while the 
situation has remained unchanged in the Netherlands, FYROM, Poland and Slovakia. 
Governmental credit institutions also increased in number in FYROM and Italy, but 
decreased in Finland. The number of suppliers rose in Greece, FYROM and Slovakia, while 
remaining unchanged in Finland and Poland. Other (informal) creditors grew in number in 
Slovakia, decreased in the Netherlands and stayed the same in Sweden, FYROM and Poland. 
Table 6. Number of creditors, change over the last ten years 
 Increased Decreased Unchanged 
Commercial banks Finland, FYROM, 
Slovakia, France  
Greece, Poland Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, 
UK 
Mortgage institutions Slovakia, UK   Sweden, FYROM  
Farmers’ cooperative 
banks  
  Greece Netherlands, FYROM, 
Poland, Slovakia 
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Table 6. cont’d 
Governmental credit 
institutions  
FYROM, Italy Finland   
Suppliers  Greece, FYROM, Slovakia, 
UK 
Belgium Finland, Poland 
Others (informal) Slovakia Netherlands Sweden, FYROM, Poland  
Note: No data on the number of creditors for Germany. 
The share of the total volume per loan provider to agricultural operations over the past ten 
years is displayed in Table 7. Commercial banks have increased their share in Sweden, 
Finland and FYROM, decreased their share in Greece, Poland, Slovakia and the UK, and held 
it unchanged in the Netherlands and Italy. Mortgage institutions have increased their share 
of total volume in Sweden and the UK, decreased it in Slovakia and kept it the same in 
FYROM. Farmers’ cooperative banks have increased their share in Poland, decreased it in 
Greece and kept the same share in FYROM and Slovakia. Governmental credit institutions 
have increased their share in the Netherlands, FYROM and Italy, and decreased it in Finland. 
Suppliers have increased their share in Greece, FYROM and Slovakia, decreased it in Sweden 
and held it unchanged in Finland, Poland and the UK. Others (informal) creditors have 
increased their share in Poland and Slovakia, while decreasing it in Sweden, the Netherlands 
and FYROM. Also when it comes to the share of volume, Greece seems to be switching from 
commercial banks and farmers’ cooperative banks to suppliers. Sweden seems to be moving 
in the other direction: away from suppliers and informal creditors towards commercial banks 
and mortgage institutions. The Netherlands seems to be moving away from informal 
creditors and replacing them with governmental credit institutions. FYROM also seems to 
moving away from the informal sector and towards more formal creditors, such as suppliers, 
governmental credit institutions and commercial banks. 
Table 7. Share of total volume, change over the past ten years 
 Increased Decreased Unchanged 
Commercial banks Sweden, Finland, 
FYROM, Germany 
Greece, Poland, 
Slovakia, UK 
Netherlands, Italy 
Mortgage institutions Sweden, UK Slovakia, 
Germany 
FYROM  
Farmers’ cooperative 
Banks  
Poland Greece  FYROM, Slovakia, Germany 
Governmental credit 
institutions  
Netherlands, FYROM, 
Italy 
Finland Germany 
Suppliers  Greece, FYROM, Slovakia Sweden, Belgium Finland, Poland, UK 
Others (informal) Poland, Slovakia Sweden, 
Netherlands, 
FYROM 
 
Note: No data for France. 
2.4 Functioning of the credit market and access to credit 
Typical for an inefficient (malfunctioning) credit market are agency problems (asymmetric 
information, moral hazard, adverse selection), uncertainty and credit constraints. 
Agency problems might be more prevalent in closely held agricultural firms compared with 
closely held firms in other sectors of the economy, mainly due to the legal form of the 
organisation. A proprietary farm is generally not obliged to publicly disclose its financial 
situation.  
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Adverse selection occurs because of asymmetric information: the creditor or the bank does 
not have accurate knowledge of the agricultural firm. The owner of the firm possesses 
information about the nature of success of each investment project. Therefore, for the bank it 
is difficult to separate good investments/borrowers from risky ones or the likely defaulters. 
In this situation, such information as the previous credit history of the farm owner has a 
crucial role in the selection of the borrower and also the interest rate associated with the 
borrowing.  
Moral hazard problems mainly arise when the owner has private benefits of control and 
ownership, although a debt may enhance the incentives to perform well. The creditor or the 
bank needs to correctly evaluate the possible moral hazard or adverse selection problems that 
can emerge with any debt issued. At the time of approving a loan, the bank needs to know the 
future possible cash flow of the loan applicant, as the delays or any type of default will be very 
costly.  
Finally, uncertainty plays a vital role in every financial market, since it is impossible to 
foresee the future. Uncertainty can be caused by lax regulations or the overall health of the 
national and global economy. This leads to higher transaction costs (Scully, 1988). 
Uncertainty and information asymmetry are strongly related to one another and information 
asymmetry can lead to increased uncertainty.  
Although these types of problems are present in any sector, they might be more prominent in 
proprietary farms owing to the few or no obligations in relation to public disclosure or 
reporting liabilities, except the annual tax statement. Hence, it is crucial for the bank either 
to trust the farm seeking a loan in light of a long-term relationship or to be able to assess the 
correct financial status through a credit rating or business rating or a sufficient amount of 
collateral. 
Weber and Musshoff (2012) show that the delinquency ratio is reduced if the debtor has a 
deposit at the bank, pointing to the possibility to use that as cash collateral. Collateral is thus 
an efficient way to reduce uncertainty and the amount and type of collateral varies with the 
risk perceived by the bank. In many situations, a haircut can also be introduced on the 
collateral, which is a percentage that is subtracted from the market value of an asset that is 
being used as collateral. The size of the haircut reflects the perceived risk associated with 
holding the asset. 
In proprietary farms, there is lack of differentiation between business assets and private 
assets, leading to difficulties in using assets as collateral. Also, a farmer needs to execute good 
judgement when using a certain asset (for example farm machinery or land) since he/she 
might lose a vital part of the business if defaulting on the loan. In addition, an evaluation of 
the quality of collateral can create some sources of conflict between the parties and may 
require a third party’s evaluation (for example, a land or a car valuation). A necessity for well-
functioning collateral is that there is demand for the asset used as collateral. For farmers this 
means that land and buildings are usually good for collateral, but machinery and equipment 
might not be. Who would buy second-hand milking equipment if the milk farmer defaults on 
his/her loans? 
Table 8 shows the reasons for rejecting credit applications. The top three reasons (score 1-2 
for most countries) are lack of collateral, insufficient farm business income and the poor 
credit history of the applicant. The least important reasons are the lack of appropriate 
farming or management education, and a weak previous relationship with the creditor. In 
general, the business-related reasons score higher than the more personal reasons 
(education, experience and relations).  
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Table 8. Reasons for rejecting credit applications* 
Reason 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of appropriate 
farming or 
management 
education 
 Italy Netherlands, 
FYROM 
Sweden, 
Finland,  
UK,  
Greece, 
Germany, 
Italy 
Poland, 
Slovakia 
Lack of appropriate 
farming or 
management 
experience 
 Sweden, 
Netherlands, 
FYROM 
UK,  
Greece, 
Germany 
Italy 
Finland, 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Insufficient farm 
business income 
Sweden, 
Italy 
Finland, 
Netherlands, 
Greece, 
FYROM, 
Slovakia 
Germany, 
Poland 
 Italy 
Insufficient 
household income 
 Finland, 
Greece, 
Poland, 
Slovakia 
Sweden,  
UK, 
Netherlands 
Germany Italy 
Weak previous 
relationship with the 
creditor 
 Greece, 
Poland, Italy 
Sweden,  
UK, 
Netherlands, 
Italy, 
Slovakia, 
Germany 
 Greece 
Poor credit history 
of the applicant 
Poland,  
Italy,  
Sweden, 
Netherlands, 
FYROM, 
Slovakia  
UK, Germany Finland  
Lack of collateral UK,  
Greece, 
Italy 
Netherlands, 
Greece, 
FYROM, 
Poland, 
Slovakia,  
Sweden, 
Finland, Italy, 
Germany 
Finland  
Insufficient business 
plans 
 Sweden, 
Netherlands, 
FYROM, 
Poland, 
Slovakia 
UK,  
Italy, 
Germany 
Italy  
Other (state reason):     Poland 
* 1 = Most often the case for rejection; 2 = Often the case for rejection; 3 = Sometimes the case for rejection; 4 = 
Rarely the case for rejection; 5 = Least often the case for rejection 
Note: No reply for Ireland, Belgium and France. 
Mezzanine financing is the middle ground between equity and traditional loans. The debtor 
lends money at a higher interest rate (15-20%) based, for example, on cash-flow expectations 
– no collateral is demanded. The creditor can gain the right to equity or just have the 
principal back after the maturation of the loan (Financial News, 2012). A mezzanine loan can 
thus be of use when there is no collateral available. 
There are mezzanine markets in the UK, Slovakia and in Greece (see Table 9). Most countries 
do not seem to have any mezzanine markets, and in Germany the judgement is that there 
would be little demand for that in the agricultural sector. The same conclusion holds for 
Greece; there is a mezzanine market but it is not used much. 
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Table 9. The existence of a mezzanine market 
Country Response 
Sweden No 
Finland No 
Ireland No reply 
UK Yes 
Netherlands No 
Greece Yes, but it is rarely used 
FYROM No reply 
Germany Not for the agricultural sector specifically, unlikely to be any demand for it 
Poland No 
Italy No 
Slovakia Yes 
France No reply 
Belgium No 
 
Assuming that credit rationing is connected to the risk assessment of the creditors, the 
characteristics of the borrower can become an important factor in explaining credit rationing 
in agriculture. And the characteristics of the farm household have been shown to have an 
effect on credit rationing. The education level will influence the credit constraints: a higher 
education level leads to a higher chance of receiving a loan. The household income also 
influences the credit constraints: a higher household income reduces the risk of experiencing 
credit constraints, either through the demand for credit being lower in a higher-income 
household or through the creditor perceiving the investment to be more secure (Nuryartono, 
et al., 2005). Similar results are also found in Rahji and Adeoti (2010). Petrick (2004), on the 
other hand, found that education level was not a significant factor in determining the risk of 
being credit-rationed, whereas other characteristics, such as the number of adult females 
(increasing the risk of being under credit constraints) and the number of adult males in a 
household (decreasing the risk of being under constraints) were found to influence the risk of 
being credit-rationed. 
Across all countries, the highest weight is given to business-related characteristics, such as 
‘estimated farm business profit (cash flow)’ and ‘the available business collateral’ (see Table 
10). This is particularly true for Sweden, Finland, the UK (1-3) and FYROM. In the 
Netherlands, the estimated business profit is not given as high a weight as the ‘available 
household income’. In Greece, the weights are quite evenly distributed over more or less all 
characteristics. In Italy, there are two types of investments that have been used as examples; 
both of them emphasise the ‘appropriate farming or management experience’, especially IT-
2. Slovakia also shows a rather even distribution of weight over all characteristics except ‘the 
available business collateral’ and ‘available household income’ that are assigned no weight at 
all. 
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Table 10. Weights assigned to different characteristics when performing a risk assessment 
  SE FI UK-1a)  UK-2b) UK-3c) NL EL FYROM PL IT-1d) IT-2e) SK 
Appropriate 
farming or 
management 
education 
– – 5 0 1   10 1 5 5 – 10 
Appropriate 
farming or 
management 
experience 
10 – 5 15 15 1 10 1 10 20 75 10 
Estimated farm 
business profit 
(cash flow) 
50 40 60 30 65 1 15 55 25 20 20 20 
Available 
business 
collateral 
30 40 10 30 10 55 20 30 20 15 5 – 
Available 
household 
income 
2 10 2 0 2 30 5 5 10 5 – – 
Available non-
farm assets for 
use as collateral 
3 10 5 10 1 5 15 5 10 5 – 20 
Extent of the 
previous 
relationship 
with the 
creditor 
3 – 10 5 1 5 15 1 10 10 – 30 
Credit history of 
the applicant 
and his/her 
family 
2 – 3 10 5 1 10 2 10 20 – 10 
Other (state the 
characteristic) – – – – – 2 – – – – – – 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
a) Farm & Country Finance 
b) Wall 2 Wall Finance 
c) Lloyds TSB Agriculture  
d) Cariparma Credit Agricolé 
e) ISMEA 
Note: No reply for Ireland, Germany, France or Belgium. 
In asset-based lending, the credit decision is based on the availability and quality of collateral 
of the firm. At the other end of the scale, a credit decision can be based on the investment 
itself: Will it give enough cash flow to pay interest and repay the full amount? In Table 11, the 
results of the questionnaires are shown. A majority of the case studies shows a tendency 
towards cash flow-based lending. In the UK, Greece and Italy, asset- and cash flow-based 
lending have equal weight and in Poland asset-based lending is more important than 
expected cash flow. For some countries (the UK, the Netherlands and Poland), these results 
are inconsistent with the results displayed in Table 10. In the UK, while the characteristic 
‘estimated farm business profit (cash-flow)’ has a high weight in the risk assessment related 
to credit evaluation (Table 10) and later when there is an application for extending an 
existing loan, the asset (collateral) and the cash-flow are given the same level of importance 
(Table 11). Results for the Netherlands show the opposite: cash flow is more important when 
extending a loan.  
 
14  JANSSON, HUISMAN, LAGERKVIST & RABINOWICZ 
Table 11. Importance of different factors for extending a loan 
 Only asset-
based lending: 
Consideration 
is only given if 
there is 
enough 
collateral 
wealth that 
can be easily 
liquidated in 
case of default 
More 
asset-
based than 
cash flow-
based 
lending 
Asset base 
and cash 
flow are 
given the 
same  
level of 
importance 
More cash 
flow-based 
lending 
than asset-
based  
Only cash flow-
based lending: 
Consideration 
is only given if 
there is 
sufficient and 
reliable 
expected cash-
flow generated 
from loan-
funded 
activities 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 
Sweden    √  
Finland    √  
Ireland No reply 
UK   √   
Netherlands    √  
Greece   √   
FYROM 1 2 3 5 4 
Germany    √  
Poland  √    
Italy   √   
Slovakia    √  
France No reply 
Belgium No reply 
 
In this section, the significance of personal relations, financial situation and the possibility 
for agricultural firms to receive credit compared with other firms is presented. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) studied the correlation between relationships involving a creditor 
and a debtor and the access to capital by the debtors. It turned out that the length and the 
extent of a relationship does have an impact, mainly on the availability of capital, but not on 
the price (interest rates) of capital.  
For most countries, the answers show that the business is more influential than the 
connections when it comes to first-time credit (see Table 12). In Finland, that is all that 
counts. In Greece and Italy, equal weight can be given to personal relations and estimated 
economic outcome. Only in Italy is there more weight given to the personal relationship than 
to the estimated economic outcome (according to one of the respondents).  
A majority of the case studies shows that the agricultural firm has a somewhat or much 
greater possibility to obtain credit compared with other small rural firms (see Table 13). In 
the UK and Italy, they are perceived as having the same possibilities and in Greece and 
Slovakia their possibilities are smaller. Thus, in part the case studies point in another 
direction than studies showing that agriculture has a greater problem with credit rationing 
than other sectors (Weber and Musshoff, 2012). 
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Table 12. Importance of personal relations for receiving credit 
 Only the 
personal 
relationship 
matters 
More weight 
given to the 
personal 
relationship 
than to the 
estimated 
economic 
outcome 
Equal 
weight given 
to the 
personal 
relationship 
and the 
estimated 
economic 
outcome 
More weight 
given to the 
estimated 
economic 
outcome 
than to the 
personal 
relationship 
Only the 
estimated 
economic 
outcome 
is 
important 
Relation 
between (a) and 
(b) 
100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100 
Sweden    √  
Finland     √ 
Ireland No reply     
UK    √  
Netherlands    √  
Greece   √   
FYROM    √  
Germany    √  
Poland    √  
Italy  √ √   
Slovakia    √  
France No reply     
Belgium No reply     
 
Table 13. Assessment of the possibility of a farmer to obtain a loan in comparison with other 
small rural firms 
 Far less Somewhat 
less 
The same Somewhat 
greater 
Much greater 
Sweden    √  
Finland    √  
Ireland No reply 
UK   √   
Netherlands    √  
Greece  √    
FYROM    √  
Germany    √  
Poland     √ 
Italy   √   
Slovakia  √    
France No reply 
Belgium No reply 
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2.5 Availability of credit 
The availability of a sufficient amount of credit can be of great importance for rural farm 
owners and there might be a mismatch between the demand and supply of credit. Credit 
rationing is a term that is used when the borrower cannot obtain the required amount of loan 
and faces a credit constraint (Jaffee and Russel, 1976; Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990; Petrick, 
2005). Often information asymmetry leads to the problem of credit rationing, which is more 
common for small firms than for large firms (Hashi and Toci, 2010). Credit constraints can 
also be a characteristic of equilibrium in the loan market in contrast to the general opinion 
that credit rationing may be the result of disequilibrium (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). The bank 
aims at retrieving the loan amount plus interest. If the bank sets the interest rates too high 
the risk of default is larger, thus lowering the potential profit. In other words, it is the profit-
maximising interest of the bank that is determining the interest rate and at that rate also the 
supply of capital, not the demand for capital. 
Many studies on credit rationing in agriculture concentrate on developing countries (Weber 
and Musshoff, 2012, Nuryartono, et al., 2005, as well as Rahji and Adeoti, 2010, to name a 
few). But the problem has also been shown to exist in European agriculture (Petrick, 2004). 
This section shows the total volume of credit, the total asset value and the loan to value in 
agriculture in the case study countries. These factors give an insight into the availability of 
credit in the agricultural sector. 
As shown in Table 14, the lending volume in agriculture has increased in Sweden, Finland, 
FYROM, Slovakia, the UK and Italy, and it has decreased in Greece for commercial banks. 
Mortgage institutions have increased their lending volume in Sweden, the UK and Slovakia, 
while the volume has remained unchanged in FYROM. Farmers’ cooperative banks have 
increased their lending volume in the Netherlands and Poland, decreased it in Greece and 
kept it at the same level in FYROM and Slovakia. The government credit institutions have 
increased their lending volume in FYROM and Italy, and decreased it in Finland. Suppliers 
have been increasing their lending volume in Greece, the UK, FYROM and Slovakia, while 
their volume has remained unchanged in Finland and Poland. Other (informal) creditors 
have increased their volume in Slovakia, decreased it in the Netherlands and shown no 
change in Sweden, FYROM and Poland. 
Table 14. Lending volume, change over the past ten years 
 Increased Decreased Unchanged 
Commercial banks Sweden, Finland, 
FYROM, Poland, Slovakia, 
Italy, UK 
Greece   
Mortgage institutions Sweden, Slovakia, UK   FYROM 
Farmers’ cooperative 
Banks  
Netherlands, Poland Greece FYROM, Slovakia 
Governmental credit 
institutions  
FYROM, Italy Finland   
Suppliers  Greece, FYROM, Slovakia, 
UK 
Belgium Finland, Poland 
Others (informal) Slovakia Netherlands Sweden, FYROM, Poland  
Note: No data for Germany or France. 
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The total volume of credit varies with the size of the agricultural sector in the case study 
countries (see Table 15). Poland and Slovakia have relatively small credit volumes 
considering their sizes. The total asset value, together with information on the credit volume, 
can give a hint about the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in the countries, which has been 
calculated in Table 15. There were not replies for all countries to the question concerning the 
total asset volume, but among those for which responses were given there was a varying level 
of LTV, from 2% in Poland to 58% in the UK.2 Generally, LTV ratios above 80% are perceived 
as high and less than 80% are perceived as low in the housing market. 
Table 15. Total volume of credit and total asset value in the case study countries  
(in million €) 
Country Total credit Total asset value LTV (%) 
Sweden 23 000 No reply – 
Finland 4 500 20 000 23 
Ireland  5 077a) No reply – 
UK 13 600b) 23 270b) 58 
Netherlands 43 500 136 500 32 
Greece 2 7 29 
FYROM No data No reply – 
Germany 49 650a) No reply – 
Poland 500 30 000 2 
Italy 41 000 8 082d) – 
Slovakia 390 3 400 11 
France 40 500c) No reply – 
Belgium No reply 
a) Including forestry, fishery and aquaculture  
b) Average exchange rate for 2009 
c) Data source: Ministry of Agriculture, Bureau du Crédit 
d) Total value of gross fixed investments in real value 
LTV can be a sign of how different operators perceive the risks of investing in agriculture. In 
Table 15 it was calculated based on total credit and total asset value as reported in the 
questionnaires, but there is also a direct question about LTV in the questionnaire. The 
numbers reported in the questionnaires show much higher values than the calculated LTV in 
Table 15. This indicates that the actual LTV is lower than the potential LTV. 
The typical LTV varies among the countries, from 60% in Finland to 100% in the Netherlands 
(see Table 16). There is no variation among the types of providers; however, in the UK there 
is a difference of 5% between mortgage institutions (at 70%) and commercial banks (at 75%), 
indicating that the mortgage institutions would be more restrictive when giving credit with 
farmland as security. 
 
 
                                                        
2 As a comparison, the LTV for house loans in the eurozone varied between 63% and 101% in 2007 
(ECB, 2009). Although both house buyers and farmers can use real property as collateral, the two 
should not be directly compared: in the housing market the collateral and the investment are the same, 
whereas a farmer might use farmland as collateral when investing in equipment or machinery.  
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Table 16. Typical loan-to-value ratio for farmland (in %) 
Country Commercial 
banks 
Mortgage 
institutions 
Farmers’ 
cooperative 
banks 
Governmental 
credit 
institutions 
Suppliers 
(sellers of 
machinery, 
seeds, etc.) 
Sweden 75 – 75 – – 
Finland 60 60 60 – 60 
Ireland No reply – – – – 
UK 75 70 None exists None exists – 
Netherlands 100 – 100 – – 
Greece 75 – 75 – 0 
FYROM No reply – – – – 
Germany Not possible to answer 
Poland 80 – 80 – ? 
Italy – – – – – 
Slovakia 70 – – 70 – 
France No reply – – – – 
Belgium – na na na – 
 
For farm buildings, the situation is the same as for farmland. In Slovakia, however, the LTV is 
lower for buildings than for land (see Table 17); in other words, they perceive land as a more 
secure asset than buildings. 
Table 17. Typical loan-to-value ratio for farm buildings (in %) 
Country Commercial 
banks 
Mortgage 
institutions 
Farmers’ 
cooperative 
banks 
Governmental 
credit 
institutions 
Suppliers 
(sellers of 
machinery, 
seeds, etc.) 
Sweden 75 – 75 – – 
Finland 60 60 60 – 60 
Ireland No reply – – – – 
UK 75 70 None exists None exists  
Netherlands 100 – 100 – – 
Greece 75 – 75 – 0 
FYROM No reply – – – – 
Germany – – – – – 
Poland 80 – 80 – ? 
Italy – – – – – 
Slovakia 50 – – 50 – 
France No reply – – – – 
Belgium – na na na – 
 
The typical LTV ratio varied between 0 for equipment and machinery from suppliers in 
Greece and 100% for several providers in the UK, the Netherlands and Poland. The LTV ratio 
is lower than for land and buildings in Sweden and to some extent in Slovakia for commercial 
banks (see Table 18). On the other hand, additional creditors appear to give a higher LTV 
ratio: in Sweden and the UK it is the suppliers, and in Slovakia it is governmental credit 
institutions. In Poland and the UK, the loan-to-value ratio is higher for equipment and 
machinery than for land and buildings.   
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Table 18. Typical loan-to-value ratio for equipment and machinery (in %) 
Country Commercial 
banks 
Mortgage 
institutions 
Farmers’ 
cooperative 
banks 
Governmental 
credit 
institutions 
Suppliers 
(sellers of 
machinery, 
seeds, etc.) 
Sweden Around 40 – – – 75-80 
Finland – – – – – 
Ireland – – – – – 
UK 100 – None exists None exists 100 
Netherlands 100 – 100 – – 
Greece 70-75 – 70-75 – 0 
FYROM – – – – – 
Germany – – – – – 
Poland 80 – 80-100 – ? 
Italy – – – – – 
Slovakia 30 50 – 30 – 
France – – – – – 
Belgium – na na na – 
 
The LTV ratio for operating capital (including inventories) varies between 40% (Slovakia and 
Sweden) and 100% (the Netherlands and Poland) across all types of loan providers (see Table 
19). At commercial banks, the LTV ratio is lower for operating capital (including inventories) 
than it is for land and buildings in Sweden, the UK and Greece. For Greece, Poland and 
Slovakia, the LTV ratio is higher for operating capital at commercial banks than it is for the 
other asset categories. For Greece and Poland, this is also true for the farmers’ cooperative 
banks. Suppliers feature high loan-to-value ratios (100%) in Finland and Poland, a bit lower 
in Slovakia (60%) and around 40% in Greece. 
Table 19. Typical loan-to-value ratio for operating capital, including inventories (in %) 
Country Commercial 
banks 
Mortgage 
institutions 
Farmers’ 
cooperative 
banks 
Governmental 
credit 
institutions 
Suppliers 
(sellers of 
machinery, 
seeds, etc.) 
Sweden Around 40 – – – – 
Finland – – – – 100 
Ireland – – – – – 
UK 70 – None exists None exists – 
Netherlands 100 – 100 – – 
Greece 90 – 90 – Around 40 
FYROM – – – – – 
Germany – – – – – 
Poland 100 – 100 – 100 
Italy – – – – – 
Slovakia 40 – – 40 60 
France – – – – – 
Belgium – na na na – 
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3. The institutional framework for agricultural credit markets – 
Conclusions 
The main aims of this study are to describe and compare the credit markets in the case study 
countries and to determine whether agricultural firms have problems obtaining credit owing 
to the institutional framework. As mentioned in the introduction, the collection of data 
through the questionnaire turned out to be a difficult task, and fully completed 
questionnaires were not obtained for all the countries. Nevertheless, some interesting 
conclusions can be drawn from this material.  
The regulation of financial markets is mostly general – only a few countries have specific 
regulations for the agricultural sector, and even then it is regarding particular subsidies for 
agriculture. This indicates that the agricultural credit markets are not perceived to need 
specific regulations. On the other hand, many governments – all but four3 actually – give 
some sort of credit support to agriculture, implying that there is a belief that the capital 
market for agriculture is not functioning efficiently. This seemingly contradictory situation 
might be caused by the fact that there are different ministries and authorities dealing with the 
financial sector and the agricultural sector; the finance ministries do not have special 
regulations for agriculture but the agricultural ministries introduce various types of support. 
At the firm level, some of the implications associated with the different types of creditors can 
be quite severe. If a bank provides credit for an investment, it is up to the farmer to decide on 
the proper allocation of resources by his or her firm. If instead an investment is financed 
through monthly (future) instalments to, for example, a machine supplier, the farmer has no 
way of reallocating resources, and if he or she is unable to pay the suppliers can reclaim the 
machinery at short notice. Thus, it is a more efficient strategy for the farmer to have 
traditional bank loans rather than debts to suppliers. Another positive effect of long-term 
loans is that they build a long-term relationship, which we have seen is an important factor 
when it comes to extending loans. The dominant loan providers are commercial banks and 
farmers’ cooperative banks. In two countries, however, the suppliers have relatively high 
shares of the market (FYROM and Slovakia), though they are decreasing. In Greece, on the 
other hand, they seem to be increasing in importance.  
The calculated values for the LTV ratios in Table 15 show much lower numbers than the 
answers in the questionnaire. Therefore, the actual lending is lower than what the financial 
experts in the individual countries in general would expect for the sector. Extremely low 
values are found in Poland and Slovakia. Does this imply that they are severely under-
capitalised? Credit rationing has been shown in Poland (Petrick, 2004), so it is not far-
fetched that the low LTV ratio also implies that agriculture is under-capitalised. An 
interesting, and surprising, outcome of the survey is that firms in the agricultural sector are 
more likely to obtain credit than other small rural firms. Thus, agricultural firms should be 
better off and probably less credit-rationed than other firms.  
Uncertainty, asymmetric information and moral hazard are examples of factors leading to an 
inefficient market in which credit constraints might occur. To reduce the negative effects of 
these factors, there are different strategies: requirements for collateral can reduce the risk of 
the investment and hence reduce the effects of uncertainty. Long-term relations will reduce 
the effects of asymmetric information, as the bank’s knowledge of a firm increases over time. 
A long-term relationship will also reduce the risk of moral hazard, since it is easier for the 
bank to trust someone after a longer relationship. 
Assets are not as important as the expected cash flow of the planned investment when 
extending a loan. Only in Poland is asset-based lending more widespread than that based on 
cash flow (this is in line with the findings of Petrick and Latruffe, 2006). When undertaking a 
risk assessment for a first-time loan application, the situation is a bit different: in most 
                                                        
3 These are Ireland, the UK and Slovakia plus Sweden; the only involvement in Sweden is that the state 
is a shareholder in one of the biggest banks, NORDEA. 
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countries a higher weight is given to cash flow, except in the Netherlands, where the 
emphasis is on collateral. In the Netherlands, assets are the most significant factor at the 
beginning of a creditor–debtor relationship, and later on the investment itself is more 
decisive. The survey also shows that (for most countries) the financial situation of the firm or 
the economic potential of the investment are more influential factors in risk assessments 
than personal characteristics. 
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Appendix 1. Description of the survey  
Planning and formulating questions for the questionnaire was undertaken for deliverable 
(D.2.2.1) in collaboration with other teams of the Factor Markets consortium.  
The questionnaire was sent out to team members of the consortium during spring 2011. They 
in turn passed the questionnaire on to national financial experts, some with agricultural 
expertise, some with general expertise.  
In some of the countries it turned out to be difficult to find any national expert who was 
willing to complete the questionnaire. This may be related to the background in which the 
survey was conducted, with the banks having been criticised for a long period for their lax 
risk assessments partly causing the financial crisis that started in 2007. Nevertheless, all 13 
questionnaires were returned to the SLU team by August 2011. The questionnaires were all 
read and compiled into tables to give a comparable image of the case study countries. 
The SLU team is most grateful to the contact persons among the partners who helped gather 
the questionnaires.  
Country Contact person 
Sweden Chelsey Jo Huisman (SLU) 
Finland Sami Myyrää (MTT) 
Ireland Trevor Donellan (Teagasc) 
UK Barbara Tocco (University of Kent) 
Netherlands Harold van der Meulen (LEI) 
Greece Eleni Kaditi (CEPS) 
FYROM Stefan Bojnec (SIOL) 
Germany Martin Petrick (IAMO) 
Poland Jan Fałkowski (Warsaw University) 
Italy Veneziani Mario (Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore) 
Slovakia Jan Pokrivcak (Slovak Agricultural University) 
France Laure Latruffe (INRA) 
Belgium Kristine van Herck (KU Leuven) 
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire 
Institutional framework of the market for agricultural credit 
1. (General descriptive questions) 
a. Estimate, in terms of shares of volume per asset category, the main providers of 
credit to farm operations (primary production) in your country. In addition, please 
provide an estimate of the total outstanding volume of credit for each asset category 
(in euros).  
 Farmland  Farm buildings 
(included in land) 
Equipment 
and machinery  
Operating 
capital, incl. 
inventory  
 Share of volume  Share of volume  Share of volume  Share of volume  
Commercial banks      
Mortgage 
institutions  
    
Farmers’ 
cooperative banks  
    
Governmental 
credit institutions  
    
Suppliers (sellers 
of machinery, 
seeds, etc.)  
    
Others (informal)      
Total share  100%  100%  100%  100%  
Outstanding 
volume (€) 
    
 
b. Here we are interested to know which types of governmental credit institutions that 
may exist in your country to provide credit to agricultural operations. Please use the 
boxes below to check (√) the appropriate option – more than one option can apply.  
Government-
owned agency 
that is market-
funded 
Government 
agency that 
supplies 
subsidised 
government 
loans to 
farmers  
Private banks 
that supply 
government-
subsidised 
loans, market-
funded  
Private banks 
that transfer 
subsidised 
government 
loans and 
receive 
commission 
fees from 
government  
Not applicable 
(i.e. there are no 
such 
institutions)  
     
 
2. What is the estimated total volume of credit in your country to agricultural operations 
(farming)? 
3. Give an estimate of the total asset value of the primary agricultural industry (farm 
operations) in your country. 
4. How has the number of creditors, their volume and their share of the total volume of 
credit to agricultural operations changed over the past ten years? 
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 Number of creditors Lending volume Share of total volume 
 Incr. Decr. Unch. Incr. Decr. Unch. Incr. Decr. Unch. 
Commercial 
banks 
         
Mortgage 
institutions 
         
Farmers’ 
cooperative 
banks  
         
Governmental 
credit institutions  
         
Suppliers (as 
in question 1) 
         
Others 
(informal) 
         
 
5. Which institutions and/or authorities regulate or supervise the agricultural credit market 
in your country? Describe the role of each institution. Please provide contact information 
such as web addresses, emails to appropriate contact persons at supervisory institutions. 
6. Describe the regulatory framework for agricultural credit in your country. We are, in 
particular, interested in aspects such as the emphasis given to law, regulation, directions 
or guidelines in the institutional framework.  
7. Per each credit market actor and for each listed asset category, respectively, what is the 
typical maximum loan-to-value (share of required credit) that can be used to finance a 
typical investment (please give your answers as percentages)? 
 Farmland  Farm buildings  Equipment and 
machinery  
Operating 
capital incl. 
inventories  
 Maximum share 
of credit given to 
an investment  
Maximum share 
of credit given to 
an investment  
Maximum share 
of credit given to 
an investment  
Maximum share 
of credit given to 
an investment  
Commercial banks      
Mortgage 
institutions  
    
Farmers’ 
cooperative banks  
    
Governmental 
credit institutions  
    
Suppliers (sellers 
of machinery, 
seeds, etc.)  
    
 
8. For each reason listed in the table below, and according to your expertise, to what extent 
is this the reason why credit applications for a typical investment proposal by farmers are 
rejected? 
Use the following scale and check () the appropriate box: 
1: Most often the case for rejection,  
2: Often the case for rejection,  
3: Sometimes the case for rejection,  
4: Rarely the case for rejection,  
5: Least often the case for rejection. 
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Reasons 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of appropriate farming or management education      
Lack of appropriate farming or management experience      
Insufficient farm business income      
Insufficient household income      
Weak previous relationship with the creditor      
Poor credit history of the applicant      
Lack of collateral      
Insufficient business plans      
Other (state reason)      
Other (state reason)      
 
9. Is there a functioning mezzanine credit market in your country? 
10. Envisage a typical risk assessment related to a credit evaluation of a farming investment 
proposal (assume this to be a case where the farm operator has applied for credit to 
expand his/her operation by investing in new buildings and equipment for some type of 
livestock production). Please provide an assessment of the weights that typically would 
be assigned to the following characteristics of the applicant. Consider the lender to be the 
most typical lender for investments of the stated type. Assume further that there is, at 
least, some prior relationship between the two parties. 
Characteristics of the applicant Weight in risk assessment 
Appropriate farming or management education  
Appropriate farming or management experience  
Estimated farm business profit (cash flow)  
The available business collateral  
Available household income  
The available non-farm assets for use as collateral  
The extent of the previous relationship with the creditor  
The credit history of the applicant and his family  
Other (state the characteristic)  
Other (state the characteristic)  
Total 100%  
 
11. What means of government support are available in the agricultural credit market of 
your country?  
a. Check () the appropriate (to indicate that this alternative is available in your 
country). 
b. What is the relative importance of each measure of government support in relation 
to a given investment? (Again, assume this to be a case where the farm operator has 
applied for credit to expand his/her operation by investing in new buildings and 
equipment for some type of livestock production) (please give your answers in 
percentages). 
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 Loans (principal 
from government) 
Subsidised 
interest rates with 
principal 
purchased in open 
market 
Payback 
guarantees 
Investment 
allowances (part 
of the 
investment cost 
is recovered as a 
subsidy) 
Total 
a      
b      
 
 None of the alternatives are applicable. 
12. Consider the personal relationship between the bank and the loan applicant in a 
situation where a farmer has applied for a loan to finance an investment (again assume 
the same type of investment as above).  
Rate the importance of (a) the personal relationship (elements of trust, future prospects, etc.) 
versus (b) the estimated economic outcome of the investment proposal for the credit decision 
of the lender. 
 Only 
personal 
relationship 
matters 
More weight 
given to 
personal 
relationship 
than to 
estimated 
economic 
outcome 
Equal weight 
given to 
personal 
relationship 
and 
estimated 
economic 
outcome 
More weight 
given to 
estimated 
economic 
outcome 
than to 
personal 
relationship 
Only estimated 
economic 
outcome is 
important 
Relation 
between 
(a) and 
(b) 
100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100 
Check your 
answer (√) 
     
 
13. Now consider the factors that would be relevant for extending an already existing loan: 
rate the importance of available collateral versus the expected cash-flow generation from 
the loan. 
Only asset-based 
lending: 
Consideration is only 
given if there exists 
enough collateral 
wealth that can be 
easily liquidated in case 
of default 
More asset-
based lending 
than cash flow-
based lending 
Asset base and 
cash flow are 
given the same 
level of 
importance 
More cash 
flow-based 
lending than 
asset-based 
Only cash-flow-
based lending: 
Consideration is only 
given if there exists 
enough and reliable 
expected cash flow 
generated from loan-
funded activities 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
14. Please assess the possibilities of a farmer to obtain credit for a larger farm investment, in 
comparison with other rural-based small firms (assume them to have similar cash flows).  
Check () the most appropriate alternative: 
Far less Somewhat less The same Somewhat greater Much greater 
1 2 3 4 5 
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